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Housing and the Financial Crisis:
Causes, Consequences, Cures
 By Michael E. Stone1

Introduction
Sub-prime lending was but the last card in the
house of cards that is the U.S. housing system and
its senior partner – the global financial system. To
those who say that no one could have predicted
its collapse, I say “NONSENSE!” Not only was its
collapse predictable; it was predicted. In 1975 –
34 years ago – I wrote the following:
Meanwhile the inability of working-class families
to keep up existing mortgage payments has increased mortgage defaults and foreclosures on
both owner-occupied housing and apartment
buildings…. Unable to deal with the causes of
mortgage defaults and foreclosure, which lie
within the institutions of capitalism, the options
available will only compound the problem in the
long run. The proposals all basically involve …
increasing debt…. Adding more claims to future
income in these ways only adds to the increasing
vulnerability of the entire financial system as well
as the mortgage system in particular….
Since that time, I have chronicled the growth and
instability of this house of cards (Stone, 1978;
1980a; 1980b; 1983, 1986; 1993; 2006b).
Obviously, little heed was paid to my jeremiads.
This article sketches how the house of cards
was constructed and collapsed, and will identify
a few of the elements for building a different
and solid house.

The house of cards
Just as there are four suits in a deck of playing
cards, so there are four suits of cards out of
which the housing house of cards has been built:
1. Wide and widening income inequality;
2. Persistent and pervasive racism in housing
provision;
1

3. Treating housing increasingly as a speculative
commodity at all levels; and
4. Over dependence on debt and the private capital markets to finance housing.
This deck of cards also includes wild cards and
jokers in the form of public policies that exacerbated the growth and instability of the house.
Note that, with the exception of racism, which
has a particular character and dynamic in the
U.S. and connection to the crisis, all the other
suits of cards are in no way unique to the U.S.
and have highly relevant global linkages.
1. Wide and widening inequality: consequences for housing
For a generation after World War II in most of
the developed capitalist world, there was modest reduction in inequality. However, during the
1960s the fabric began to unravel; the 70s were
a transition time and by the 80s neo-liberal ideology and practice were well entrenched, leading
to the drastic increase in inequality since then
(Stone, 1993, pp. 103-140; Tilly, 2006).
The first consequence for housing, at least in the
wealthier parts of the world, has been reduced
affordability and rising house prices. On the one
hand, since the mid-1970s most households in
the U.S. have experienced little if any increase
in their real incomes (Tilly, 2006, pp. 25-26). On
the other hand, those at the top with more and
more income have been driving up home prices,
in both the owner-occupied and rental sectors, in
existing housing and new (Stone, 2006a).
The second consequence has been decreased
ability for most households to save. This, in turn,
has had two major results: (a) Most households
have had reduced capacity to make substantial
down payment to buy, and hence there has been
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a push for lower down payments, i.e, higher
loan-to-value ratios in the mortgage market, with
associated increases in risk; (b) Furthermore, because middle-income households have not had
money to put into savings (thrift) institutions,
which traditionally were the self-sustaining
source of most residential lending, housing finance has had to become more dependent on
the capital markets.
The third major consequence for housing of
widening inequality is that those at the top
of the distribution have directly and indirectly also pursued high profits in the capital
markets, contributing to the bubble of mortgage-backed securities.
2. Racism in all aspects of the provision of
housing
There is a rather widespread view is that housing discrimination in the U.S. has largely ended,
that segregation is an historical artifact that is
gradually dissipating and that, to the extent it remains, reflects free choice in the market place.
None of this is true.
Segregation has at best only modestly declined,
and discrimination persists in the rental, sale,
financing and insuring of housing. The burdens
are greatest for Black households in most parts
of the country, but there is evidence that the
situation is worsening for Latinos and Asians
(Denton, 2006).
The relevance of this to the current crisis is that
the convergence of demography and geography
– i.e., structural racism – created a largely untapped market, vulnerable to predatory practices
in the sale, financing and refinancing of housing,
as people of colour were swept into the grand
illusions of mortgaged homeownership (Squires
and Kubrin, 2006; Stone, 2006b, pp. 94-96).
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Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank and its affiliated organisations, or
those of the Executive Directors of The World Bank or the institution the author works
for or is affiliated with.

Housing and the Financial Crisis: Causes, Consequences, Cures
3. The speculative housing market
While treating housing as an object of speculation
has a long and dishonourable history, it has become particularly pernicious in recent decades.
Everyone came to believe that they are entitled
to make a killing in residential real estate, up and
down the food chain – not just distant investors,
intermediate mortgage packagers, and nearby
speculators and mortgage brokers – but including far too many homebuyers and homeowners.
This attitude has been coupled with the idealisation and over-promotion of speculative
homeownership, based on a series of myths
(that Kemeny, the author and a number of
others identified decades ago; for critical examination of these myths, see, e.g.: Dean, 1945;
Stone, 1975; Kemeny, 1981; Heskin, 1983; Edel,
Sclar and Luria, 1984; and Stone, 1993, pp.
18-22; for an Australian critical examination of
homeownership, see Badcock and Beers, 2000):
I. that you are always better off economically as
a homeowner than a renter because you no
longer have a landlord who can raise the rent;
II. that homeownership assures you of free housing in your old age;
III. that homeownership is a sound and effective
way to build assets/accumulate wealth;
IV. that property values always go up, at least
as long as you can keep undesirable activities and undesirable people out of your
neighbourhood;
V. that homeowners are full citizens, but renters
are not;
VI. that the degree of societal development is
correlated with the homeownership rate; and
VII. the illusion of ownership through the reality
of DEBT….
4. Over dependence on debt and the private
capital markets to finance housing
Because housing is costly to produce and most
producers are relatively small businesses, housing development is very dependent on borrowed
money. More significantly, though, because housing is both a commodity and long-lasting, the
transfer of houses is financed almost entirely by
borrowed money, with the property as collateral.
Furthermore, because housing is a speculative
commodity, it is the prime source of collateral for
borrowing even without transfer, i.e., refinancing
and home equity borrowing.
Taking these three elements together, no sector of
the economy has been as dependent on debt as

housing. Over the entire period since World War II,
housing-related debt has been the fastest growing
component of the entire financial system. Over the
past three decades, housing finance became fully
integrated into global capital markets, with the full
fruition of mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and
their derivatives. A major consequence has been
that housing related debt has grown faster than
the overall economy and hence faster than the
ability to repay it.
From the late 80s to early 90s, there was a deep
recession in the U.S., declining house values,
high foreclosures, slow recovery. From the mid90s to the mid-00s, the U.S. experienced the
longest period of growth in over a century, but
it was built on increasing inequality and debt.
Combined with ever widening income inequality,
and the more active and aggressive promotion of
mortgage homeownership since the 1990s, the
dependency of housing on debt has been turned
into addiction, creating debt junkies at all levels
of the system and pushers emerging at all levels
because of enormous and growing opportunities
for profit (Stone, 2006b).

Public Policies
The instability in these suits of cards was in turn
stimulated and exacerbated by an array of public
policies:
a. Housing and related Taxation Policies: Since
the 1930s, the primary focus of housing
policy in most of the predominantly white,
English-speaking countries has been the promotion of mortgaged homeownership. This
has consisted of institutions to support lending,
ideological promotion and marketing, and subsidies through the tax system.		
The flattening of the progressive income
tax and tax cuts in the U.S. since 1986 has
contributed to widened income inequality, and
provided more money at the top of the income
distribution for speculation in housing and financial markets.			
With regard to tax benefits for homeownership,
they are particularly regressive in the U.S., but
by no means unique. The benefits rise with
tax bracket, house value, mortgage amount,
interest rate. Over half the benefits flow to the
top 10% of the income distribution. No wonder
it has been labelled the “mansion subsidy.”
Indeed, recently even conservative economists
have been recognising that they distort the
housing market, create perverse incentives
to borrow and speculate, as well as depriving
the Treasury of revenue (Glaeser and Shapiro,
2003; Carasso, Steuerle, and Bell, 2005).
b. Privatisation of the public institutions of housing

finance (see Stone, 1993, Part II, and Stone,
2006b): The end of the post-war prosperity in
the 1960s led to increased competition for credit, rising interest rates, and disintermediation
from savings institutions. One major response
was the expansion and privatisation of secondary mortgage markets. In 1968 Fannie Mae
(FNMA) privatisation began; in 1970 Freddie
Mac (FHLMC) was created. Fannie and Freddie
are (were) quasi-public government sponsored
enterprises (GSEs), with implicit government
guarantees of their paper, but profit-motivated
institutions with private shareholders. GSEs
package mortgages into pools; they issue securities sold into capital markets backed by pools
of mortgages. Initially these were plain vanilla
pass-through securities bought mostly by institutional investors like pension funds, insurance
companies and commercial banks.
c. Deregulation and lax regulation of private financial institutions and activities has been
another, more publicised, major facet. A big
push in the 1970s culminated in extensive deregulation of the financial system in the 1980s,
which in turn was a direct cause of the drastic decline of the traditional model of housing
finance, leading to the late 1980s S&L crisis
in the U.S. (Stone, 2006b). In the late 1990s
there was a second wave, pushed by some
of President Obama’s top economic advisors
(Helmore, 2008). Add to deregulation, lax enforcement of remaining regulations and failure
to regulate new, high-risk products and institutions over the past decade.
d. Monetary policy: Loose money/low interest
rates by Greenspan’s Fed encouraged borrowing and speculation, and leveraging of
little capital with lots of debt to invest in high
risk/high return real estate and capital market
vehicles (see, e.g., Morris, 2008, pp. 62-65).
Implications for Households
Trends pointed to problems even before the
sub-prime surge. First, there was a steady trend
toward bigger, more costly houses. Second, in the
U.S. homeownership peaked in 1980 and then
declined until 1994. But in 1995 homeownership
started to increase, with a focus on lower income
households, especially households of colour.
(This was the result of various factors, including
the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), easing
of usury limits on interest rates resulting in more
sub-prime lending, plus the Clinton administration’s homeownership push; see Stone, 2006b;
Immergluck, 2009.)
However, by the middle of the current decade,
five vulnerabilities became apparent at the base:
I. the spread of high-risk non-traditional loans:
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not just sub-primes, but a whole menagerie:
alt-A, “ninja” (no interest, no job or assets),
interest only, negative amortization, 100%+
loan-to-value, adjustable rate loans, option
ARMs, etc.
II. rising housing occupancy costs: not only due to
mortgage resets, but also increasing cashing
out of equity, including refinancing of original
primes into sub-primes; and debt costs, add
rising property taxes, heating costs;
III. h igh leverage: meant lots of people with no
equity cushion; so any decline in prices would
mean negative equity in which default would
be more likely;
IV. d eclining incomes: many people on the margin of being able to afford their housing (and
other) debts, even with multiple jobs/incomes,
facing risk of default if laid off, personal or family member illness, divorce, new child, etc.;
V. d eclining property values: fewer and fewer
buyers able to sustain ever higher prices
meant eventually and inevitably prices would
turn down.
Implications and Consequences for the
Financial System
Slicing and dicing of MBS into collateralised mortgage obligations (CMOs), originated by Freddie
Mac in 1984, was so profitable for Freddie and
Fannie, that in the 1990s Wall Street began
private pooling and securitising of prime mortgages, outside of Fannie and Freddie, and then
issued sliced and diced securities against these
pools of plain vanilla MBS, derivatives of these
securities, collateralised debt obligation (CDOs),
etc. (Stone, 2006b; Immergluck, 2009).
But the mid-90s already gave hints of problems
with securitisation and derivatives: computer
models were inadequate because they did not
account for the possibility of refinancing; thus,
in the mid 90s there was an MBS crisis, with
chaos in MBS markets (Stone, 2006b). Yet no
constructive lessons were learned by the industry, regulators or policy-makers. Instead, new
opportunities and new products were launched
in the MBS markets.
In order to expand the volume of MBSs, it was
necessary to promote vast increases in mortgage
lending: on the one hand, since homeownership
rates in the US were declining overall and were
especially low for households of colour, there
was both motive and opportunity for a whole
new wave of over promotion of homeownership
to underrepresented populations; on the other
hand, among existing homeowners rising house
16

prices created enormous increases in home
equity, stimulating an orgy of refinancing, home
equity loans, purchases of 2nd and 3rd homes
and investment properties, etc.

While it is apparent that a comprehensive program
of reform is needed, my primary focus here will be
on pieces of the ownership and financing agenda.

Non-prime lending (sub-prime, Alt A, etc.)
had long existed, but there had been no secondary market because such loans did not
meet Fannie and Freddie standards. So, there
were limited originations of such loans until
the early 2000s, when Wall Street, looking
for highly profitable outlets for vast pools of
cash, started to buy and securitise non-prime
mortgages. This led to a stampede into highprofit, non-prime MBSs and derivatives upon
derivatives, with profits multiplied by fees and
by high leveraging fostered by low interest,
expansive monetary policies (Morris, 2008;
Baker, 2009; Immergluck, 2009).

Ownership:

Instability in Fannie and Freddie was already apparent by early 2000s (Stone, 2006b). Nonetheless,
with loss of market share to Wall Street, Fannie
and Freddie lowered their standards to compete
in non-prime secondary market and keep share
prices up and stockholders happy, with heavy
lobbying to prevent regulation.
This process generated almost limitless profit opportunities ostensibly for homebuyers,
homeowners and speculators, but especially
for the inventors and purveyors of exotic mortgage products.
Of course it also piled risks ever higher, as each
and every level – not just homebuyers and
homeowners – became leveraged to the hilt,
borrowing far beyond any realistic potential of
repayment – built on the myth that residential property values always and forever rise – a
classic bubble.
Culmination and Collapse
Together these were a perfect storm that blew
apart the house of cards. The vulnerabilities at
the base resulted in surging defaults and foreclosures, and not just on sub-prime loans. While
the foreclosure rate is of course much higher on
sub-prime loans, most loans are not sub-prime
and, indeed, about half of foreclosures have been
on prime loans.
As all of the suits of cards had been built into an
enormous yet precarious house, it was then inevitable that the collapse would spread up through
the financial system to create the worst global
economic crisis since the Great Depression, in
which housing finance was also deeply implicated.

HOW TO BUILD A SOLID HOUSE

T he TIAA-CREF is a nearly $400 billion full-service financial services group of companies that has dedicated itself to helping those in the academic, medical, cultural, and
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How can we address two major sources of both
housing affordability and broader economic instability, viz, treating housing as a speculative commodity,
and the over-dependence on debt to finance housing? We should greatly increase the amount of
debt-free, non-speculative housing, which includes
public housing, non-profit rental housing, and, my
particular focus, an adaptation of the mutual housing alternative to mortgaged homeownership
(Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation, 1985;
Stone, 1993, chapter 7; Stone, 2006c).
A mutual housing association (MHA) is a non-profit cooperative corporation, made up of residents,
prospective residents and other community
members. An MHA finances housing to the greatest extent possible through capital grants rather
than mortgage debt. Residents make a modest
“down payment,” which is returned with interest upon moving out. In the conventional MHA
model, capital grant financing is used to reduce
residents’ costs. In the modified MHA proposed
here, residents would have monthly charges in
lieu of mortgage payments, with the amount
based on some affordability standard. This money,
which would have gone for mortgage payments
in conventional housing, would instead, like individual development accounts (IDAs), be put into
safe investments such as term deposits at banks,
money market accounts or similar vehicles; these
investment funds could and should be managed
by competent, respected, non-profit intermediaries, such TIAA-CREF.2 Since wealth accumulation
is separated from homeownership, residents may
not sell their homes for a profit, thereby maintaining affordability for future generations.
What does the model offers residents?
control over their homes comparable to
conventional homeownership;
greater security of tenure because there’s no
risk of mortgage foreclosure;
asset development comparable in magnitude,
on average, to conventional homeownership;
but superior in terms of security (vulnerability),
stability (volatility) and liquidity.
While especially beneficial for low and moderate
income households, there is no reason for it to be
limited. It is not second-class homeownership. It
is a smart alternative that should be made widely
available as a choice.

research fields for over 90 years. For more information, please see www.tiaa-cref.org.
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Financing:
Debt-free non-speculative housing of all types
should be financed by capital grants from Housing
Trust Funds. In the US there are several hundred
state and local HTFs, and in the summer of 2008
a National Housing Trust Fund (NHTF) was finally
enacted, after a very long grassroots campaign.
I have proposed that the NHTF be capitalised
through a tax of about a few tenths of a percent
on all capital market financial transactions, including stocks, bonds, mortgage-backed securities,
derivatives, etc. Even such a tiny tax could generate several hundred billion dollars per year
(Stone, 1993, pp. 266-268;Baker, 2000; 2008).

fully in the public domain, they should remain
there (without shareholders, without highly
paid executives, without high-priced lobbyists),
issuing government-backed, plain vanilla passthrough mortgage-backed securities on the
plain vanilla mortgages; such securities should
be prohibited from being sliced and diced and
pyramided with derivatives; this would provide
liquidity and access to the capital markets for
responsible lending without the greed, speculation and risk that brought the system down;
Strongly regulate financial markets, with transparency and accountability, including prohibition
on pyramiding of securities, and including explicit criminal as well as civil liability for violations.

Such a dedicated revenue source would be
p rogressively redistributive;
not subject to the whims of the annual appropriation process; and
not add to government budget deficits.
It could provide financing for upwards of a million units a year of debt-free non-speculative
housing, though:
n ew construction;
acquisition of some private housing, such as
foreclosed homes; and
preservation of at-risk subsidised housing.
Macro-economic benefits:
A tax on financial transactions would reduce speculation in the capital markets. Also, under the
MHA model the money that would have gone for
mortgage payments into unproductive, speculative housing wealth would under the MHA model
be available for investment in productive activities
for a sustainable future.
Housing Finance Reform
In addition to the specific ownership and financing
approach just described, I also propose a series of
structural reforms to the existing housing finance
system:
Prohibit high-risk loans and restore plain vanilla
mortgage loans: fixed-rate, fully-amortised,
level-payment loans requiring non-negligible
down payments (along with mortgage insurance
and default insurance);
Restore and strengthen local, mutually-owned
& public lenders: credit unions, mutual savings
banks, depositor owned s&ls, community loan
funds and public lenders (HFAs);
Promote the Ginnie Mae model for mortgage
securitisation: now that Freddie and Fannie are

Comprehensive Program
These are a few of the building materials needed
to construct a strong house on a solid foundation.
For other elements of a comprehensive program to
address not only the manifestations but underlying
causes of the housing crisis, see the Appendix.

Conclusion
At this monumental moment, we have the opportunity to begin constructing a New Social
Democracy for the 21st Century. I am not naively optimistic about the prospects politically,
but am nonetheless certain that it is a goal
worth pursuing.
We housing researchers have a particular responsibility in this effort - as intellectuals, as
practitioners and as activists. Housing, as all of
us surely know, lies at the core of the dilemmas
and challenges facing our families, our communities, our nations and our planet. The resolution
of these dilemmas is to be found not through the
celebration of selfish individualism, but rather
through the rediscovery of social responsibility
and the transformation of our economic institutions. Let us join in this grand endeavour.
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Expand social, non-profit, and non-speculative
ownership and production of housing, to ensure long-term affordability, community viability,
and responsible use of public resources. Social,
non-profit and non-speculative housing can be
expanded through:

Stone, Michael E. 1980b. “The Housing Problem
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Socialist Review 10:4 (July/August), pp. 65-117.
Stone, Michael E. 1983. “Housing and the
Economic Crisis: An Analysis and Emergency
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new housing production;
preservation of subsidised rental housing
(public and privately-owned) as permanently
affordable to low-income households, with
increasing resident and community control
and ownership;

T he TIAA-CREF is a nearly $400 billion full-service financial services group of companies that has dedicated itself to helping those in the academic, medical, cultural, and
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financial assistance to low and moderate-income homeowners who are shelter poor or
facing foreclosure, in return for their agreement to transfer to social ownership;
buyout of absentee-owned, unsubsidised private rental housing through negotiated sale
or eminent domain.
F inance the production and acquisition of social
housing through direct public capital grants rather than debt, to reduce both the affordability
burden of mortgage payments and the instability
of the financial system.
Reform the financial system, in order to deflate
the credit bubble, reduce speculative uses of
credit and assure an adequate supply of credit
-- to complement capital grants -- for productive
investment in housing, as well as infrastructure
and job-producing industry. All private capital
market participants should be required to make
below-market set-asides to finance non-speculative housing and community development. Credit
allocation authority and incentives should be used
to steer private savings to community loan funds,
state housing finance agencies and mutually-owned thrift institutions.
Increase the capacity and scale of housing development by socially-oriented developers, and
increase public and community control over
land and housing production. Public and social
resources for housing development should be
directed increasingly to community development corporations, mutual housing developers,
regional non-profit housing organisations, labour
unions, and local housing authorities. Public financing of responsible private development for
non-speculative ownership should not be precluded, particularly if under community control or
in joint ventures with social developers.
 eform landlord-tenant law to facilitate teR
nant unionisation and institutionalise collective
bargaining rights, just cause for eviction, habitability standards and enforcement, dispute
resolution, and resources for technical and organising assistance.
Establish employer accountability and financial responsibility for contributing to meeting
the housing needs of their workers and communities. Unions should negotiate for housing
trust funds as part of their members’ benefits.
Private commercial and luxury developers
should make linkage payments or meet inclusionary housing requirements. Other
employers should establish voluntary housing
programs or make payroll tax payments into
housing trust funds.
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Housing and the Financial Crisis: Causes, Consequences, Cures
 ecognise in housing and income policies the
R
disproportionate growth of affordability problems
among larger households, and among households headed by women (both non-elderly single
parents and older women without spouses).
Since the housing crisis is one of the causes and
manifestations of the crisis of U.S. families (with
“family” broadly understood to include both nontraditional and traditional living arrangements),
resources and support should be provided for
appropriate and innovative housing schemes
and designs, and supportive social and community services, as well as economic assistance.
E nforce anti-discrimination laws fully and aggressively, along with affirmative programs within
communities of colour and the larger society to
expand housing as well income opportunities for

those who have always been disproportionately
shelter poor because of racism.
Support community control and resident empowerment in the production and operation of
housing, in balance with principles of social responsibility, non-discrimination, and inclusionary
planning and development.
Assure adequate and secure incomes to all
households. This should be through gainful employment at decent wages for all those able to
participate in the paid labour force and through
appropriate income supports for those who
cannot obtain adequate incomes through employment. Income supports should consist of
direct affordability assistance for those unable to
afford social-sector housing costs, plus supple-

mental aid to the very lowest income households
who would be unable to meet their non-shelter
needs at a minimum level even with full housing
assistance.
Provide adequate public resources and allocate
them equitably for social housing, community
development, services, and income supports.
Resources should be generated through balanced economic growth, redirection of federal
budget priorities away from the military, plus
creation of a truly progressive income tax (including strong disincentives for speculation in
housing, land and other assets, and phasing
out of the increasingly regressive deductions for
mortgage interest and property taxes).
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